“Zero tolerance towards corruption should be the top-notch priority for ensuring system based and policy driven, transparent and responsive governance. Corruption cannot be annihilated but strategically be dwindled by reducing monopoly and enabling transparency in decision making. However, fortification of social and moral fabric must be an integral component of long-term policy for nation building to accomplish corruption free society.”
– Justice Ajay Rastogi
State of Gujarat v. Mansukhbhai Kanjibhai Shah,
Justice Ajay Rastogi was born on 18th June 1958 in Jaipur to Shri. Harish Chandra Rastogi. He followed the footsteps of his father and joined the bar in 1982. During the years of his practice at Rajasthan High Court, he practised in different spheres of law but was specialized in service and labour laws.
♦Did you know? Justice Ajay Rastogi’s father Late Harish Chandra Rastogi was an eminent civil lawyer in Rajasthan High Court.
Justice Rastogi took oath as a Judge in the Rajasthan High Court on 02-09-2004. He was officiated as the Administrative Judge of the Rajasthan High Court on 19-07-2014 and continued till his elevation as Chief Justice of the Tripura High Court.
After his appointment as a judge of the Rajasthan High Court, Justice Rastogi remained Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority from 14-10*2013 to 18-10-2016.
♦Did you know? Under his stewardship, Rajasthan Legal Services Authority won the National Award from National Legal Services Authority for three consecutive years.[1]
Justice Rastogi was also the Acting Chief Justice of the Rajasthan High Court w.e.f. 14-04-2016 to 13-05-2016.
Justice Ajay Rastogi was recommended by the Collegium for being appointed as Chief Justice of the High Court of Tripura on February 1, 2018 and took oath on 01-03-2018. He was elevated as Judge of the Supreme Court on 02-11-2018.
♦Did you know? The collegium had superseded Justice Maheshwari in October, 2018 when it recommended the elevation of the then Chief Justice of the Tripura High Court, Justice Ajay Rastogi — originally from the Rajasthan High Court — to the Supreme Court.[2]
Career as an Advocate
Justice Ajay Rastogi practised in the Rajasthan High Court in Constitutional, Service and Labour Laws etc. His field of specialisation was Service and Labour Law.
Justice Rastogi was nominated as the standing counsel for the Rajasthan High Court in the year 1990 and continued as such till his elevation in the year 2004. He also worked as the standing counsel for Rajasthan Financial Corporation, Jaipur, Board of Secondary Education, Rajasthan, Ajmer, and of various Banking Institutions, Electricity Board & Educational Institutions etc.[3]
Justice Rastogi was also appointed President of the Rajasthan High Court Bar Association at Jaipur in the year 1999-2000.
Justice Ajay Rastogi had marked his presence in many remarkable cases as an advocate. Some of the significant cases represented by him are:
- Navneet Bansal v. State of Rajasthan, 2004 SCC OnLine Raj 72
- Vinod Kumar Agarwal v. Judicature for Rajasthan, 2004 SCC OnLine Raj 242
- RPSC v. Sadhana Bagharhatta, 2003 SCC OnLine Raj 127
- Suresh Kumar Bishnoi v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 SCC OnLine Raj 256
- Bhanwarlal v. RSTC, 1984 SCC OnLine Raj 81
- Sunil Kumar Saxena v. University of Rajasthn, 1989 SCC OnLine Raj 108
- Suraj Mal Soni v. State of Rajasthan, 1992 SCC OnLine Raj 95
- Kedar Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 1996 SCC OnLine Raj 380
Notable Judgments at Supreme Court
The bench of NV Ramana and Ajay Rastogi, JJ, has agreed to examine the validity of a newly enacted law which makes the practice of instant divorce through triple talaq among Muslims a punishable offence entailing imprisonment of up to three years.[4]
Ajmer Vidyut Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Hindustan Zinc Ltd., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 208
The Division Bench comprising of Ajay Rastogi* and Abhay S. Oka, JJ., held that a modification changing tariff for inadvertent drawal from temporary supply rate to the regular supply rate cannot be considered to be a mere clarification and is rather a substantial alteration which cannot be made applicable retrospectively.
Pawan Kumar v. Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 532
The Division Bench of Ajay Rastogi* and Sanjiv Khanna, JJ., reversed the impugned order of Delhi High Court whereby the High Court had upheld the dismissal order of appellant owing to suppression of information/false declaration in the verification form regarding criminal antecedent.
The Court held that the effect of suppression of material/false information involving in a criminal case is that it is left for the employer to consider all the relevant facts and circumstances available as to antecedents and keep in view the objective criteria and the relevant service rules, while taking appropriate decision regarding continuance/suitability of the employee into service.
P. Ranjitharaj v. State of T.N., 2022 SCC OnLine SC 508
The Division Bench comprising Ajay Rastogi and Bela M. Trivedi, JJ., reversed the impugned judgment of the Madras High Court and held that when the delay in appointment is attributable to the State, it would not deprive the employees of their right to become the member of the Pension Scheme, 1978 merely on the ground that the Scheme was not applicable to their year of appointment, particularly when other candidates who participated in the common process of selection were availing the same.
Union of India v. Ex. Constable Ram Karan, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1041
The Division Bench of Ajay Rastogi* and Abhay S. Oka, JJ., set aside the judgment of the Delhi High Court wherein it had substituted the penalty of removal from service with confinement of respondent from 1.00 p.m. to 10.00 p.m. in quarter guard jail without noticing the mandate of the nature of punishments indicated under Section 11(1) of the Central Reserve Police Force Act, 1949 (CRPF). The Bench expressed,
“The scope of judicial review on the quantum of punishment is available but with a limited scope. It is only when the penalty imposed appears to be shockingly disproportionate to the nature of misconduct that the Courts would frown upon.”
Sudhir Kumar Atrey v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 971
The Division Bench comprising of Ajay Rastogi* and Abhay S. Oka, JJ., expressed dismay over the manner adopted by the Western Command, Military Engineering Service in making appointments from the select panel of 29-06-1983 after a lapse of 4-5 years in the year 1987-1988.
“…the manner in which the appointments were made from the select panel of 1983 after it has outlived its life in the year 1987-1988 and ordinarily it was not open to be operated upon and such appointments are nothing but a clear abuse of the discretion vested with the competent authority.”
V. N. Patil v. K. Niranjan Kumar, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 172
The bench of Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi*, JJ., held that the aim of every Court is to discover the truth but it should be done judiciously.
The Court opined that though it is not necessary to record elaborate reasons in every case, the Courts should do so in order to facilitate the superior Courts to understand what weighed in with the Court to reverse the finding of the lower court.
“Wider the power, greater is the necessity of caution while exercise of judicious discretion”
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Rachna v. Union of India, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 140
While refusing the plea of last attemptees of the UPSC Civil Services (Preliminary) Examination, 2020 who had sought for an extra attempt to clear the exam in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the bench of Justice AM Khanwilkar, Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi*, JJ held that allowing extra attempt in such a case would set a precedent and also have cascading effect on examinations in other streams.
“… merely because the present petitioners made a complaint to this Court, cannot be taken into isolation for the purpose of seeking additional chance/attempt in the backdrop of Covid-19 pandemic, which has been faced by not only the candidates appeared in Examination 2020 but by the candidates appeared in the various examinations/recruitment tests held by the State Commissions or by other recruiting agencies and by and large, every member of the society in one way or the other but that does not in any manner give legitimate right to the petitioners to claim additional benefit/attempt which is otherwise not permissible under the scheme of Rules 2020.”
While discussing its related to issuing mandamus to frame policy, the Court held that the Judicial review of a policy decision and to issue mandamus to frame policy in a particular manner are absolutely different and Courts cannot issue mandamus to frame policy.
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Gauri Shankar v. State of Punjab, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 96
The Division Bench of Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi*, JJ., confirmed punishment of life imprisonment for remainder of natural life awarded to a man accused of murdering two minor children aged 4 years and 2 years in brutal manner by administering celphos to them.
The Court observed that a trial court while sentencing an accused to life imprisonment cannot order that such imprisonment is for the remainder of his/her natural life. The power only lies in the hand of High Courts and the Supreme Court to direct the same.
“It is true that the punishment of remainder of natural life could not have been imposed by the learned trial judge but after looking into the entire case, we consider it appropriate to confirm the sentence of imprisonment for life to mean the remainder of natural life while upholding the conviction under Section 302 IPC.”
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Sudipta Chakrobarty v. Ranaghta SD Hospital, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 107
Criticising the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (NCDRC) for its practice of passing ‘reasons to follow’ orders, the bench of Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has asked the President of the NCDRC to take necessary steps so that this practice is discontinued, and the reasoned Judgment is passed along with the operative order.
The Court also observed that in all matters where reasons are yet to be delivered, it must be ensured that the same are made available to the litigating parties positively within a period of two months.
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Soumitra Kumar Nahar v. Parul Nahar, (2020) 7 SCC 599
“In a custody battle, no matter which parent wins but the child is always the loser”
In a case involving prolonged Court battle over child custody rights, the Division bench of AM Khanwilkar and Ajay Rastogi*, JJ., held that the Courts should decide the issue of custody on a paramount consideration which is in the best interest of the child who is the victim in the custody battle.
“Rights of the child need to be respected as he/she is entitled to the love of both the parents. Even if there is a breakdown of marriage, it does not signify the end of parental responsibility.”
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Pankjeshwar Sharma v. State of J&K, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 984
“Negative equality cannot be claimed to perpetuate further illegality”
A 3-Judge Bench comprising of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta and Ajay Rastogi*, JJ. held that any appointments made deviating from merit in exceptional cases can be justified, like in instant case viz. to give quietus to litigation, however such appointments would be irregular appointments, though not illegal and the candidates left out of merit list has no right to claim the same benefit which was provided to some other candidates on basis of some erroneous concession granted by the State. The Court restated that negative equality cannot be claimed to perpetuate further illegality.
“In a situation where the posts in excess of those advertised had been filled up in extraordinary circumstances, instead of invalidating the excess appointments, the relief could be moulded in such a manner so as to strike a just balance keeping the interest of the State and the interest of the person seeking public employment depends upon the facts of each case for which no set standard can be laid down.”
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Prerit Sharma v. Bilu B.S., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 961
The 3-judge bench of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., by passing an interim order directed that there will be no reservation for to in-service doctors in Super Specialty Medical Courses for the academic year 2020-2021.
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IN RE: CONTAGION OF COVID 19 VIRUS IN CHILDREN PROTECTION HOMES, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1026
The 3-judge bench of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., has issued directions to ensure education of children in Child Care Institutions which has suffered due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
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State of Odisha v. Dilip Kumar Pratihari, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 603
The 3-judge bench of S.K. Kaul, Ajay Rastogi and Aniruddha Bose, JJ., in an application seeking condonation of delay of 587 days filed by State of Odisha, had imposed a cost of Rs. 50, 000 and directed that an enquiry be conducted and cost be recovered from the delinquent officer.
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Anun Dhawan v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 165
Displeased with the Centre and the States on repeated failures by them to file their replies on a PIL seeking setting up of community kitchens across the country, the 3-judge bench of N V Ramana, Ajay Rastogi and V Ramasubramanian, JJ., came down heavily and imposed cost of Rs. 5 lakh on them for not complying with its directions to file their affidavits on a.
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C. Bright v. District Collector, (2021) 2 SCC 392
The 3-judge bench of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ while upholding the Kerala High Court’s decision, held that the time-limit to take action by the District Magistrate has been fixed to impress upon the authority to take possession of the secured assets. However, inability to take possession within time-limit does not render the District Magistrate functus officio. Time-limits stipulated in the section, are directory and not mandatory.
Interpreting Section 14 of the SARFAESI Act, the Court said that
“… the secured creditor has no control over the District Magistrate who is exercising jurisdiction under Section 14 of the Act for public good to facilitate recovery of public dues. Therefore, Section 14 of the Act is not to be interpreted literally without considering the object and purpose of the Act. If any other interpretation is placed upon the language of Section 14, it would be contrary to the purpose of the Act.”
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Rekha Sengar v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 173
“A strict approach has to be adopted if we are to eliminate the scourge of female feticide and iniquity towards girl children from our society.”
While rejecting the bail in the case where the investigative team has seized the sonography machine and made out a strong prima-facie case against the petitioner, the 3-judge bench of MM Shantanagoudar*, Vineet Saran and Ajay Rastogi, JJ held no leniency should be granted at this stage as the same may reinforce the notion that the PC&PNDT Act is only a ‘paper tiger’ and that clinics and laboratories can carry out sex-determination and feticide with impunity.
“The unrelenting continuation of this immoral practice, the globally shared understanding that it constitutes a form of violence against women, and its potential to damage the very fabric of gender equality and dignity that forms the bedrock of our Constitution are all factors that categorically establish prenatal sex determination as a grave offence with serious consequences for the society as a whole.”
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Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Navigant Technologies Pvt. Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 157
While deciding the question as to whether the period of limitation for filing the Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would commence from the date on which the draft award is circulated to the parties, or the date on which the signed copy of the award is provided, the bench of Indu Malhotra* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., held that the period of limitation for challenging arbitral award can only commence from date of receipt of signed copy and not from the receipt of draft
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Priti Saraf v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 206
The bench of Indu Malhotra* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ, while discussing the exercise of the extraordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, or in the exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC in quashing a criminal proceeding, reiterated that the existence of civil remedies by itself is not a ground to quash criminal proceedings.
The Court held that in the matter of exercise of inherent power by the High Court, the only requirement is to see whether continuance of the proceedings would be a total abuse of the process of the Court.
“…the exercise of inherent power of the High Court is an extraordinary power which has to be exercised with great care and circumspection before embarking to scrutinise the complaint/FIR/charge-sheet in deciding whether the case is the rarest of rare case, to scuttle the prosecution at its inception.”
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BSNL v. Nortel Network India Pvt. Ltd, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 207
A bench comprising of Indu Malhotra* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., held that the period of limitation for filing an application under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would be governed by Article 137 of the First Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963.
The Court opined that the period of limitation will begin to run from the date when there is failure to appoint the arbitrator. Moreover, the Court may refuse to make the reference in rare and exceptional cases, where the claims are ex facie time-barred and it is manifest that there is no subsisting dispute.
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Vikas Kishanrao Gawali v. State of Maharashtra, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 170
Deciding the issue whether reservation for OBCs can exceed upper ceiling of 50% in local elections for entirely scheduled areas, the 3-Judge Bench comprising of A.M. Khanwilkar*, Indu Malhotra and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., held that the total seats reserved in favour of SC/STs and OBCs in local bodies should not exceed 50 percent of the total seats.
The Court read down Section 12(2)(c) of the Maharashtra Zilla Parishads and Panchayat Samitis Act, 1961 which mandated that the State should provide 27 percent reservation for OBCs as it ultra vires the provisions of Articles 243D and 243T including Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
“The challenge to the validity of Section 12(2)(c) of the 1961 Act is negatived. Instead, that provision is being read down to mean that reservation in favor of OBCs in the concerned local bodies can be notified to the extent that it does not exceed aggregate 50 per cent of the total seats reserved in favor of SCs/STs/OBCs taken together.”
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Pravat Chandra Mohanty v. State of Odisha, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 81
“When the protector of people and society himself instead of protecting the people adopts brutality and inhumanly beat the person who comes to the police station, it is a matter of great public concern.”
In a case where two police officers who had mercilessly beaten a man leading to his eventual death back in 1985, the Division Bench comprising of Ashok Bhushan* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., held that Custodial violence a crime against humanity. The Court considered the fact that both the appellants were more than 75 years of age therefore reduced the sentence awarded for conviction under Section 324 IPC to six months instead of one year and directed to pay a compensation of Rs.3.5 Lakhs each to the legal heir of the deceased in addition to the compensation awarded by the High Court.
“The custodial violence on the deceased which led to the death is abhorrent and not acceptable in the civilized society. The offence committed by the accused is crime not against the deceased alone but was against humanity and clear violations of rights guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.”
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Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710
A 3-judge bench comprising of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ, in a case where abuses were hurled by a person of upper caste at a person belonging to Scheduled Caste due to a property dispute between them, held that no offence had been committed under Section 3(1)(r) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 because the insulting or intimidating of a person belonging to a SC/ST community will not be counted as offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of them being a member of the SC/ST community.
“The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste.”
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Ministry of Defence v. Babita Puniya, (2020) 7 SCC 469
“To cast aspersion on their abilities on the ground of gender is an affront not only to their dignity as women but to the dignity of the members of the Indian Army –men and women – who serve as equal citizens in a common mission.”
In a path-breaking judgement, the Division Bench comprising of Dr. DY Chandrachud* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has held that blanket non-consideration of women for criteria or command appointments absent an individuated justification by the Army cannot be sustained in law and violates the guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution.
The Court ordered that the permanent commission will apply to all women officers in the Indian Army in service, irrespective of their years of service.
“Underlying the statement that it is a “greater challenge” for women officers to meet the hazards of service “owing to their prolonged absence during pregnancy, motherhood and domestic obligations towards their children and families” is a strong stereotype which assumes that domestic obligations rest solely on women.”
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Union of India v. Lt. Cdr. Annie Nagaraja, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 326
“A hundred and one excuses are no answer to the constitutional entitlement to dignity, which attaches to every individual irrespective of gender, to fair and equal conditions of work and to a level playing field.”
In yet another major verdict addressing the gender stereotypes and rights of women, the Division Bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., lifted the statutory bar on the engagement or enrolment of women in the Indian Navy and directed the Centre to grant Permanent Commission to women Navy officers.
“Performance at work and dedication to the cause of the nation are the surest answers to prevailing gender stereotypes. To deprive serving women officers of the opportunity to work as equals with men on PCs in the Indian Navy is plainly discriminatory. Furthermore, to contend that women officers are ill-suited to certain avocations which involve them being aboard ships is contrary to the equal worth of the women officers who dedicate their lives to serving in the cause of the nation.”
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Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 905
The 3-judge bench comprising of L. Nageswara Rao, Hemant Gupta* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., in a case relating to the adulteration of Dalda Vanaspati Khajoor Brand Ghee dating back to 1989 wherein the company was absolved of all charges but prosecution against it’s nominated office Nirmal Sen was continued, held that in the absence of the Company, the Nominated Person cannot be convicted or vice versa i.e. either both of them are convicted or none of them.
“Since the Company was not convicted by the trial court, we find that the finding of the High Court to revisit the judgment will be unfair to the appellant/Nominated Person who has been facing trial for more than last 30 years. Therefore, the order of remand to the trial court to fill up the lacuna is not a fair option exercised by the High Court as the failure of the trial court to convict the Company renders the entire conviction of the Nominated Person as unsustainable.”
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Umedsinh P Chavda v. Union of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 500
In a public interest litigation (PIL) seeking ban on sale of Coca cola, Thums Up and Soft Beverages, the 3-judge bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud, Hemant Gupta and Ajay Rastogi, JJ., has imposed a fine of Rs 5,00,000 on the petitioner for abuse of process.
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Joint Labour Commissioner and Registering Officer v. Kesar Lal, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 327
The bench of Dr. DY Chandrachud* and Ajay Rastogi, JJ has held that a service rendered at no matter how less consideration would still be a ‘service’ under Consumer Protection Act.
“So long as the service which has been rendered is not rendered free of charge, any deficiency of service is amenable to the fora for redressal constituted under the Consumer Protection Act 1986.”
Notable Judgments at High Court
Krishna Sarkar v. Government of Tripura, 2018 SCC OnLine Tri 209
In a writ petition for the claim of compensation in a medical negligence case, Ajay Rastogi*, CJ., refused to quantify compensation on mere allegation of ‘Medical Negligence’.
“…the law will take its own course but merely on an allegation of a medical negligence it cannot be established unless the parties are being permitted to lead evidence in support of their respective claim and certainly, on the disputed question of fact of alleged medical negligence…”
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Tapas Chakraborty v. High Court of Tripura, 2018 SCC OnLine Tri 57
The Division Bench of Ajay Rastogi, C.J., and S. Talapatra, J., held that once a FIR is quashed under Section 482 CrPC, no inference should be drawn to impute any adverse antecedents which in any way may deprive an individual from seeking public employment.
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Sudhir Debbarma v. State of Tripura, 2018 SCC OnLine Tri 94
“The object of the die-in-harness scheme is to provide solace to the dependent family members of the deceased employee who have lost their breadwinner and left them to destitute and in financial crunch to be mitigated at the earliest”
In a case dealing with providing compassionate appointment and how these matters are being dealt in very insensitive or casual manner by the Government officials, Ajay Rastogi*, CJ., imposed cost of Rs. 50,000/- upon the respondents authorities in taking the matter so casually in deciding the application under the die-in-harness scheme and directed the authority to recover the same from the concerned defaulting officers who are so casual in disposing of the application.
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Abhyutthanam Society. v. State of Rajasthan, 2016 SCC OnLine Raj 1947
In a public interest litigation filed for ensuring effective implementation of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, the Division Bench of Ajay Rastogi*, A.C.J., and S. Talapatra, J., held that the State Government do not holding any authority to re-write the definition of Sec.2 (d) of the Right to Education Act, 2009.
The Court also directed the State government to include children belonging to OBC & SBC categories whose parents’ annual income not exceeding Rs.2.50 lakhs as part of the notification dated 28.3.2016.
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Ganga Devi v. State, 2014 SCC OnLine Raj 1906
The Division Bench comprising of Ajay Rastogi and J.K. Ranka, JJ., while taking note of the fact that the appellant had served more than fourteen and a half years of sentence in jail without parole and that she was aged about 79 years, granted her permanent parole.
“a liberal view is to be taken at least in this particular case when admittedly, the convict-petitioner is a woman and is almost touching the age of 80 years and one never knows longevity of life but with her age, at least in this fag end of her life, she needs company of her children and so also grand children if any and spend rest of her life peacefully with them.”
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Jayant Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, 2012 SCC OnLine Raj 3000
“The government employees have neither fundamental nor statutory or moral right to resort to strike.”
While deciding the issue whether making respondents eligible for Pre P.G. Medical Examination against seats reserved for in service category by granting extra ordinary leave without pay for 32 days period for which they remained on strike amounts to misconduct, Justice Ajay Rastogi* held that whether it amounts to misconduct or not, can only be established after the disciplinary enquiry contemplated under RCS (CCA) Rules is conducted
The Court while acknowledging that the service of the medical profession is a noble service, opined that the government employees have neither fundamental nor statutory or moral right to go on strike.
“The impact of such strikes either by students and medical community who are directly connected with the hospitals is totally different from the strike in factory or trading establishment, as the ailing patients cannot be left waiting or unattended. Hospital activity is not the same as the lifeless functioning of machines in a factory or movement of trading material or other forms of commerce where workmen are being provided certain protection under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act. Almost all the activities in relation to hospital are such as require constant and incessant attending and care, unlike financial losses; the loss of life or limb cannot be recouped.”
†Ritu Singh, Editorial Assistant, EBC Publishing Pvt. Ltd.
* Judge who has penned the judgment.
[1] https://main.sci.gov.in/chief-justice-judges
[2] https://theprint.in/judiciary/scs-newest-judges-had-set-aside-aap-mla-disqualification-ruled-fashion-shows-are-taxable/179680/
[3] https://thc.nic.in/FCJprofile-HAR.html
[4] https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2019/08/23/triple-talaq-sc-issues-notice-to-centre-on-plea-challenging-the-new-law/