Supreme Court<\/strong>: In a chilling case where a 21-year-old man was sentenced to death under Sections 302<\/a> and to life imprisonment under\u00a0376A of IPC<\/a> for raping and killing his 2.5 years-old niece, the 3-judge bench of Justice UU Lalit*<\/strong>, Indu Malhotra and Krishna Murari, JJ has commuted the punishment to life imprisonment for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC<\/a> and to that of rigorous imprisonment for 25 years for the offence punishable under Section 376A IPC<\/a>. The Court also affirmed the conviction and sentence recorded by the Courts below for the offences punishable under Section 376(1), (2)(f), (i) and (m) of IPC, and under Section 6 of the POCSO Act.<\/p>\n The Court found the Appellant guilty of having committed the offence of culpable homicide amounting to murder under Section 300 IPC Fourthly.<\/a> In such cases, according to the Court, it is very rare that the death sentence is awarded.<\/p>\n Considering the age of the victim i.e 2.5 years, the Court said that the accused must have known the consequence that his sexual assault on the child would cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause her death.<\/p>\n \u201cThe evidence on record also depicts an exceptional case where two and half years old girl was subjected to sexual assault. The assault was accompanied by bites on the body of the victim. The rape was of such intensity that there was merging of vaginal and anal orifices of the victim. The age of the victim, the fact that the Appellant was a maternal uncle of the victim and the intensity of the assault make the present case an exceptional one.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n However, it could not be held that the appellant consciously caused any injury with the intent to extinguish the life of the victim. Though all the injuries are attributable to him, his conviction under Section 302 IPC<\/a> is not under any of the first three clauses of Section 300 IPC<\/a>.<\/p>\n The case at hand was a peculiar one as the offence was committed just a week after the amended Section 376A<\/a> was brought into force in the year 2013. Hence, the question before the Court was whether awarding life imprisonment in the present case would mean \u201cthe remainder of that person\u2019s natural life or with death\u201d or not.<\/p>\n Two important conclusions were made by the Court:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n To understand what led to this conclusion, let\u2019s first take a look at the legislative developments that took place around the time when the crime was committed:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n Here\u2019s what the coming into force of the Ordinance and subsequently the Amendment Act meant:<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n In the present case, when the crime was committed, the victim was about two and half years of age and the Ordinance which was holding the field.<\/strong> <\/span>However, the sentence prescribed by Section 376(2) as amended by the Amendment Act, provided that the imprisonment for life \u201cshall mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person\u2019s natural life\u201d. In such a case, the Court was posed with the question that whether such ex-po<\/em>st facto prescription would be consistent with the provisions of sub-Article (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution.\u201d<\/p>\n The Court explained,<\/p>\n \u201cAn imposition of life sentence simpliciter does not put any restraints on the power of the executive to grant remission and commutation in exercise of its statutory power, subject of course to Section 433A of the Code. But, a statutory prescription that it \u201cshall mean the remainder of that person\u2019s life\u201d will certainly restrain the executive from exercising any such statutory power and to that extent the concerned provision definitely prescribes a higher punishment ex-post facto.<\/em> In the process, the protection afforded by Article 20(1) of the Constitution would stand negated.\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n It was further held that since Section 376A<\/a> as amended by the Ordinance being gender neutral so far as victim was concerned, naturally covered cases where a victim was a woman, hence, the ex-post facto<\/em> effect given to Section 376A<\/a> by the Amendment Act from the day the Ordinance was promulgated, would not in way be inconsistent with the provisions of sub-Article (1) of Article 20 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n It was, hence, declared that the punishment under Section 376(2) of the IPC in the present case cannot come with stipulation that the life imprisonment \u201cshall mean the remainder of that person\u2019s life\u201d.<\/p>\n
\nSentencing under Section 302 IPC<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n
\n\n
\nSentencing under Section 376A IPC<\/strong><\/span><\/h3>\n
\n\n
\n
\n
\n