Armed Forces — Disability Pension — Entitlement Rules for Casualty Pensionary Awards, 1982 — R. 12, Notes 1 & 2 r/w Regn. 173, Pension Regulations of the Army, 1961 — “On duty”: In terms of R. 12, disability sustained during course of accident which occurs when personnel of armed forces is strictly not on duty may also be attributable to military service on fulfilling conditions enumerated therein provided there is reasonable causal connection between injuries resulting in disability and military service. In this case, respondent sustained multiple fracture injuries when he lost balance while climbing stairs to get to roof of his sister’s house to have a smoke, during annual leave, hence held, his injuries were accidental in nature. Respondent’s act of going towards roof to have a smoke, and falling down by no stretch of imagination can be attributed to military service since he was not “on duty” then. Thus, judgment finding that respondent was entitled to disability pension, unsustainable. [Union of India v. Vijay Kumar No. 3989606 P, Ex-Naik, (2015) 10 SCC 460]
Excise — Valuation — Expenses towards freight, insurance and unloading charges, etc. — When to be included in the valuation of the goods for the purposes of excise duty: “Place of removal” is the place or premises from where the excisable goods are to be sold after their clearance from the factory and from where such goods are removed. “Place of removal”, in a given case becomes a crucial determinative factor for the purpose of valuation. If it is found that transportation charges and transit insurance charges were incurred after the “place of removal”, then they are not to be included. On the other hand, if these charges are incurred before the “place of removal” then they are to be included while arriving at the transaction value. [CCE v. EMCO Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 321]
General Clauses Act, 1897 — Ss. 6, 6-A and 24 — Repeal — What is — Manner and form required: Repeals may take any form and so long as a statute or part of it is obliterated, such obliteration would be covered by the expression “repeal”. Thus, even an implied repeal of a statute would fall within the expression “repeal” in S. 6-A GCA, and reading of S. 6-A GCA would show that a repeal can be by way of an express omission. This being the case, the word “repeal” in both Ss. 6 and 24 GCA, would therefore, include repeals by express omission. Thus, omission of S. 280-ZA r/w S. 280-Y(d), IT Act, 1961 and its re-enactment with modification in S. 54-G, IT Act, 1961would come within operation of S. 24 GCA and the notifications issued under S. 280-ZA r/w S. 280-Y(d) would continue for the purposes of S. 54-G, IT Act, 1961. [Fibre Boards (P) Ltd. v. CIT, (2015) 10 SCC 333]
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 — Ss. 28 to 30, 3, 32, 40 to 42 and 2(11): As land was acquired by State for KIADB for purpose of establishment of industries, which in turn allotted/leased it to Company (M/s Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.), Company in the facts of the present case was not a beneficiary or “person interested” in terms of S. 2(11), KIAD Act or S. 3(b), LA Act. Hence, it had no right to participate in award proceedings for determination of market value. Further held, beneficiary in instant case was KIADB. [Peerappa Hanmantha Harijan v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 10 SCC 469]
Penal Code, 1860 — S. 306 r/w S. 114 and S. 498-A — Cruelty — Abetment to commit suicide: In this case, cruelty, torture and harassment for dowry proved, but cause of death being accidental consumption of poisonous tablets, appellants mother-in-law and sister-in-law of deceased acquitted under S. 306 but conviction under S. 498-A, confirmed. [Bhanuben v. State of Gujarat, (2015) 10 SCC 390]
Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 304-A, 337, 338 and 36 — Criminal negligence causing death [S. 304-A IPC] or endangering human life or safety causing hurt/Grievous hurt [Ss. 337/338 IPC]/Negligence: In Uphaar Cinema case, considering the old age and health conditions of appellants, fine of Rs 30 crores imposed on each A-1 and A-2 (owners of Uphaar Cinema) in lieu of their remaining period of sentence. [Sushil Ansal v. State, (2015) 10 SCC 359]
Town Planning — Town Planning Scheme — Validity of — Kamal Vihar Township Development Scheme No. 4 (KVTDS): Subsequent expansion, land acquisition, change in land use and reconstruction of land arbitrarily and illegally by incompetent authorities by blatant violation of legal and environmental procedure depriving constitutional right of landowners, is impermissible. Thus subsequent expansion of town planning scheme and resultant acquisition of land of appellant landowners, set aside. [Rajendra Shankar Shukla v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2015) 10 SCC 400]
W.B. Kerosene Control Order, 1968 — Paras 9, 5, 6, 3(a), (c) and (e) — Competent authority to issue show-cause notice or to suspend licence of agent or dealer: Expression “the Director of Consumer Goods or the District Magistrate” in Para 9 does not confer concurrent jurisdiction on both these authorities to issue show-cause notice or to suspend or cancel licence of agent or dealer. Director as defined in Para 3(d), who alone is authorized under Para 5 to grant licence to agent, alone has power to issue show-cause notice to, or suspend or cancel licence of agent under Para 9. Director as defined in Para 3(d), or District Magistrate, as defined in Para 3(e), who are both authorised under Para 6 to grant licence to dealer, both have power to issue show-cause notice to, or suspend or cancel licence of dealer. This interpretation is based on principle that authority granting licence has authority to cancel the same. [State of W.B. v. R.K.B.K. Ltd., (2015) 10 SCC 369]
