Supreme Court: The 3-judge bench of NV Ramana, Surya Kant* and Anirudhha Bose, JJ has refused to interfere with the bail granted by Kerala High Court to KA Najeeb arrested under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 but has imposed the condition that Najeeb shall mark his presence every week on Monday at 10AM at the local police station and inform in writing that he is not involved in any other new crime. He shall also refrain from participating in any activity which might enrage communal sentiments.
“In case the respondent is found to have violated any of his bail conditions or attempted to have tampered the evidence, influence witnesses, or hamper the trial in any other way, then the Special Court shall be at liberty to cancel his bail forthwith.”
Why was Najeeb arrested?
One Professor TJ Joseph while framing the Malayalam question paper for the second semester B.Com. examination at the Newman College, Thodupuzha, had included a question which was considered objectionable against a particular religion by certain sections of society.
On 04.07.2010, Najeeb along with some other members of Popular Front of India (PFI) had chopped¬off the professor’s right palm with choppers, knives, and a small axe. Country-made bombs were also hurled at bystanders to create panic and terror in their minds and to prevent them from coming to the aid of the victim. As per records, over the course of investigation it emerged that the attack was part of a larger conspiracy involving meticulous pre-planning, numerous failed attempts and use of dangerous weapons.
Najeeb was arrested on 10.04.2015 and a chargesheet was re-filed by the National Investigation Agency against him, pursuant to which he is now facing trial.
Analysis
When can bail be cancelled?
At the outset, the Court clarified that there is a vivid distinction between the parameters to be applied while considering a bail application, vis-à-vis those applicable while deciding a petition for its cancellation.
“Bail once granted by the trial Court, could be cancelled by the same Court only in case of new circumstances/evidence, failing which, it would be necessary to approach the Higher Court exercising appellate jurisdiction.”
Why did the High Court grant bail?
The High Court in the instant case had not determined the likelihood of the respondent being guilty or not, or whether rigours of Section 43-D(5) of UAPA are alien to him. It instead had exercised its power to grant bail owing to the long period of incarceration and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime in the near future. The reasons assigned by the High Court are traceable back to Article 21 of our Constitution, of course without addressing the statutory embargo created by Section 43-D (5) of UAPA.
“… gross delay in disposal of such cases would justify the invocation of Article 21 of the Constitution and consequential necessity to release the undertrial on bail.[1]”
Consideration by the Supreme Court
- Najeeb has been in jail for much more than five years.
- There are 276 witnesses left to be examined.
- Charges have been framed only on 27.11.2020.
- Two opportunities were given to the NIA who has shown no inclination to screen its endless list of witnesses.
- Of the thirteen co-accused who have been convicted, none have been given a sentence of more than eight years’ rigorous imprisonment. Hence, it can be legitimately expected that if found guilty, the respondent too would receive a sentence within the same ballpark.
“Given that two-third of such incarceration is already complete, it appears that the respondent has already paid heavily for his acts of fleeing from justice.”
Further, the presence of statutory restrictions like Section 43-D (5) of UAPA per-se does not oust the ability of Constitutional Courts to grant bail on grounds of violation of Part III of the Constitution.
“Indeed, both the restrictions under a Statue as well as the powers exercisable under Constitutional Jurisdiction can be well harmonised. Whereas at commencement of proceedings, Courts are expected to appreciate the legislative policy against grant of bail but the rigours of such provisions will melt down where there is no likelihood of trial being completed within a reasonable time and the period of incarceration already undergone has exceeded a substantial part of the prescribed sentence. Such an approach would safeguard against the possibility of provisions like Section 43¬D (5) of UAPA being used as the sole metric for denial of bail or for wholesale breach of constitutional right to speedy trial.”
The Court also reiterated that undertrials cannot indefinitely be detained pending trial. Ideally, no person ought to suffer adverse consequences of his acts unless the same is established before a neutral arbiter.
“Owing to the practicalities of real life where to secure an effective trial and to ameliorate the risk to society in case a potential criminal is left at large pending trial, Courts are tasked with deciding whether an individual ought to be released pending trial or not. Once it is obvious that a timely trial would not be possible and the accused has suffered incarceration for a significant period of time, Courts would ordinarily be obligated to enlarge them on bail.”
Further, the Court also noticed that Section 43D(5) of the UAPA is comparatively less stringent than Section 37 of the NDPS. Unlike the NDPS where the competent Court needs to be satisfied that prima facie the accused is not guilty and that he is unlikely to commit another offence while on bail; there is no such precondition under the UAPA. Instead, Section 43D (5) of UAPA merely provides another possible ground for the competent Court to refuse bail, in addition to the wellsettled considerations like gravity of the offence, possibility of tampering with evidence, influencing the witnesses or chance of the accused evading the trial by absconsion etc.
Though the Court noted that the charges levelled against the respondent are grave and a serious threat to societal harmony, however, keeping in mind the length of the period spent by him in custody and the unlikelihood of the trial being completed anytime soon, the High Court appears to have been left with no other option except to grant bail. Hence, the Court upheld the decision of the High Court attempting to strike a balance between the appellant’s right to lead evidence of its choice and establish the charges beyond any doubt and simultaneously the respondent’s rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution have been well protected.
[Union of India v. KA Najeeb, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 50, decided on 01.02.2021]
*Justice Surya Kant has penned this judgment
[1] Shaheen Welfare Association v. Union of India, (1996) 2 SCC 616
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When the charges leveled against the respondent are so grave and a serious threat to societal harmony, when 276 witnesses are still left to be examined, merely because would not the release of this mercenary endanger the lives of these witnesses? The benefit of Article 21 ought to be seen in a comparative perspective vis-a-vis the lives and liberty of the witnesses as well as the general public. Merely because Two opportunities were given to the NIA over a period of 5 long years but NIA could not screen its list of witnesses, is sufficient justification for putting at peril, the lives of so many citizens. When there are so many adverse consequences likely to flow from the Judgement of the Kerala High Court, should not the Hon’ble Supreme Court Suo Moto reconsider its decision.
I agree with you. Please note who has fought on behalf of Nazeeb, Shaheen Welfare Association . It was a planned attack on the individual as part of conspiracy to terrorize the society . Judges were wrong.